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United States of America v. Robert
Chestman: Construing the Fiduciary
Relationship Element Under the Insider
Trading Rules
In United States v. Chestman, the Second Circuit Court of
Appeals held that in order for Rule 14e-3 of the Securities and
Exchange Act of 1934 to be valid, the rule must be read to require
a fiduciary relationship between the illegal trader and the party
harmed.2 Sections 14(e) and 10(b) of the Securities and Exchange
Act of 1934 are intended to forbid a wide range of fraudulent
practices that relate to the buying and selling of any security,
including trading while in possession of material, nonpublic
information.3 Chestman resolves an inconsistency between Rule
10b-5 and Rule 14e-3 of the Securities and Exchange Act.4 The
inconsistency arises because section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5 require
a fiduciary relationship5 between the parties to securities exchanges,
while based upon the type of security transaction at hand section
14(e) and Rule 14e-3 may not.6 Because Rule 14e-3 as written does
not include a fiduciary element, Chestman found that Rule 14e-3
is inconsistent with the basic policy of insider trading laws, such
as Rule 10b-5, which seek to prevent fraud upon the securities
market.7 The purpose of this Note is to examine the Chestman
1. 903 F.2d 75 (2nd Cir. 1990) reconsid granted, Fed. Sec. L Rep. P. 95439 (2nd Cir., Aug.
24, 1990) (CCH).
2. See infra notes 124-149 and accompanying text (examining the promulgation of Rule 14e-
3).
3. See H.R. REP. No. 910, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 8, reprinted in 1988 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEws 6043, 6051 (intent of Sections 14(e) and 10(b)).
4. See infra notes 124-149 and accompanying text (discussing the decision that Rule 14e-3
must include a fiduciary relationship within its elements in order to be a valid rule).
5. See BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 564 (5th ed. 1979) (definition of a fiduciary relationship).
6. See infra notes 32-76 and accompanying text (examining the difference between Rule 10b-
5 and Rule 14e-3).
7. See infra notes 24-25 and accompanying text (discussion of the underlying policy of the
insider trading rules).
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decision and whether Rule 14e-3 should be interpreted as requiring
a fiduciary relationship.' Part I of this Note discusses the
development of the insider trading laws.9 Part II reviews the
Second Circuit Court of Appeal's panel decision in Chestman.t
Part IT[ concludes that Rule 14e-3 should contain a fiduciary
relationship element and discusses the legal ramifications stemming
from the Second Circuit's holding in Chestman."
I. LEGAL BACKGROUND
A. History of Insider Trading Regulation--Federal Statutory Law
This Note will examine Section 10(b) of the Securities and
Exchange Act of 1934,2 Rule 10b-5 promulgated thereunder, 3
Section 14(e) of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934,14 and
8. See infra notes 111-149 and accompanying text (the decision of the Second Circuit Court
of Appeals regarding whether a fiduciary relationship is required under Rule 14e-3).
9. See infra notes 12-77 and accompanying text (structure of the insider trading laws).
10. See infra notes 111-149 and accompanying text (discussing the Chestman decision).
11. See infra notes 150-152 and accompanying text (discussing the future effects of the
decision in United States v. Chestman).
12. 15 U.S.C. § 78i(b) (1988). Section 10(b) states:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any means or
instrumentality of interstate commerce or of the mails, or of any facility of any national
securities exchange, (b) to use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any
security registered on a national securities exchange or any security not so registered, any
manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in contravention of such rules and regulations
as the Commission may prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the
protection of investors.
Id.
13. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1990). Rule lob-5 states:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any means or
instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails or of any facility of any national
securities exchange, (a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud, (b) To make
any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a material fact necessary in
order to make the statements made, in the light of the circumstances under which they
were made, not misleading, or (c) To engage in any act, practice which operates or would
operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in connection with the purchase or sale of
any security.
Id.
14. 15 U.S.C. § 78(n)e (1988). Section 14(e) states:
It shall be unlawful for any person to make any untrue statement of a material fact or omit
to state any material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of
the circumstances under which they are made, not misleading, or to engage in any
1456
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Rule 14e-3 promulgated thereunder."5 These rules have been used
to prevent a wide variety of insider trading by individuals who
could otherwise take advantage of information unknown to other
investors. 16 Such an advantage could be gained if, for example,
people buy or sell their securities at a higher or lower price than
they would have obtained had they been apprised of the
confidential, material information that the other party possessed. 7
Theoretically, these investors are hurt by the financial loss they
would not have suffered had they known of the inside
information. 8 The person with the inside information gains an
advantage by presumably buying the securities at a price lower
fraudulent, deceptive, or manipulative acts or practices, in connection with any tender
offer or request or invitation for tenders, or any solicitation of security holders in
opposition to or in favor of any such offer, request, or invitation. The Commission shall,
for the purposes of this subsection, by rules and regulations define, and prescribe means
reasonably designed to prevent, such acts and practices as are fraudulent, deceptive, or
manipulative.
Id.
15. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14e-3 (1990). Rule 14e-3 states:
(a) If any person has taken a substantial step or steps to commence, or has commenced,
a tender offer (the --offering person"), it shall constitute a fraudulent, deceptive or
manipulative act or practice within the meaning of section 14(e) of the Act for any other
person who is in possession of material information relating to such tender offer which
information he knows or has reason to know has been acquired directly or indirectly from:
(1) The offering person, (2) The issuer of the securities sought or to be sought by such
tender offer, or (3) Any officer, director, partner or employee or any other person acting
on behalf of the offering person or such issuer, to purchase or sell or cause to be
purchased or sold any of such securities or any securities convertible into or exchangeable
for any such securities or any option or right to obtain or to dispose of any of the
foregoing securities, unless within a reasonable time prior to any purchase or sale such
information and its source are publicly disclosed by press release or otherwise.
Id. Rule 14e-3 provides exceptions. Id. Persons other than natural persons who can show: (1) that the
person who made the investment decision for such person to act on a security did not know of the
material, nonpublic information; and (2) that person had used one or more policies to ensure that he
or she would not violate Rule 14e-3 are excepted. Id. Policies may be those which: (I) restrict
purchases, or sales of such securities; and (2) forbid such persons from having knowledge of such
information. Id. The following transactions do not constitute violations of Rule 14e-3: (I) Purchases
of any security which are made on behalf of the offering person, or (2) any person selling any
security to the offering person. Id.
16. See LANOEVOORT, INsmIERTRADING REouLAT oN, §1.02 at 7-14, (1989) (discussing the
reasons for insider trading regulation).
17. Id.
18. Id.
1457
Pacific Law Journal/ Vol. 22
than that at which an informed seller would have sold the
security. 19
Prohibiting the use of inside information may also enhance
corporate confidentiality.2" The corporation may wish to keep a
certain development secret in order to enhance the corporation's
value, and the rules keep insiders from exploiting and drawing
attention to this information.2" There is also the temptation to
delay the release of valuable insider information because insiders
wish to trade on the information before it is released to the
public.' The insider trading laws attempt to remove this
temptation.2
The aforementioned justifications can be summarized by stating
that it is simply unfair to allow those who are entrusted with the
power to run a corporation to act in their own self-interest and to
the detriment of the security holders' interests which they are
obligated to protect.24 Fair play is a major tenet of our American
culture and these rules attempt to assure to all persons trading in
the securities market that no one in an advantageous position will
be allowed to misuse any information gained from that position.'
B. Administrative Authority: The SEC's Rule-making Authority
Administrative agencies' powers are statutorily granted by
Congress.26 Congress granted the Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC) the power to promulgate Rule 10b-5 and 14e-3
in Sections 10(b) and 14(e) respectively.27 The statute itself
creates, as well as limits, the power of the agency to make rules.2"
19. Id. §1.02 at 8.
20. Id. § 1.02 at 10. Trading on the secret information of a corporation may attract attention
to a wide variety of interests which the corporation did not wish to reveal. Id.
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Id. §1.02 at 12.
25. Id. §1.02 at 12-14.
26. SCrWARTZ, ADmmiNSTRATiVE LAW §4.3 151 (1984).
27. See supra notes 12-15 and accompanying text (discussing Sections 10(b) and 14(e)).
28. ScHWAR7T, supra note 26, §4.3 at 153.
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So long as the SEC acts within the statute, the rules the agency
produces are valid, however, if the agency acts outside of the
statutory grant, then the rule is invalid.29
C. Case Law
The insider trading laws have been interpreted by the courts to
prohibit three types of transactions by persons in possession of
inside information.3 °
1. The Abstain or Disclose Theory
The abstain or disclose theory finds a violation of the insider
trading laws when an insider" trades in the securities of a
corporation while possessing material nonpublic information while
owing a fiduciary duty to the person at the other end of the
transaction.32 This theory was developed in two milestone
Supreme Court cases, Chiarella v. United States33 and Dirks v.
Securities and Exchange Commission.'
In Chiarella, the Supreme Court of the United States held that
section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 was designed
to prevent fraud in connection with the act of trading securities. 35
29. Id. §4.3 at 151. The power to adopt rules given to an administrative agency is not the
power to make law. Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185,212-14 (1976). The authority granted
is the power to make regulations and to carry into effect congressional will as stated by the statute.
Id. The scope of the rule adopted may not go beyond the power given to the administrative agency
under the statute. Id.
30. LANOtvooRT, supra note 16, § 1.02 at 14.
31. An insider is a person vho has a fiduciary relationship with certain traders in the market.
Id §3.02 at 70.
32. See id. at §3.01 69-70 (discussing the elements of Rule lOb-5 in the context of
misappropriating information from an employer to whom a fiduciary duty was owed).
33. 445 U.S. 222 (1980).
34. 463 U.S. 646 (1983). See LANGEVOORT, supra note 16, §2.03 at 47-57, (discussing the
Chiarella decision).
35. Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 232 (1980). In this case, Vincent F. Chiarella
was a mark-up man for a financial printer. Id. at 224. Chiarella printed documents which announced
corporate takeover bids, however the names of the corporations were removed from the documents.
Id. Chiarella was somehow able to discern the target companies' names from the documents and
subsequently traded in those companies' stocks based on that knowledge. Id. Chiarella was indicted
and convicted at the trial level, and the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed. Id. The
1459
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The decision established that, in order to violate section 10(b) and
Rule lOb-5, there must be a fiduciary relationship between the
parties to the securities transaction, even though this relationship is
not expressly required by the text of Rule lOb-5. 6 The Court
found that an insider, by reason of his or her relationship with the
entity, has access to information which was intended to be useable
for corporate purposes only, and the Court stated that it would be
unfair to allow an insider to have the advantage of this information
in trading with that corporation's shareholders.37 Thus, a fiduciary
relationship between a corporate insider and the corporations
shareholders is a premise upon which Chiarella and Dirks are
based.38
When a fiduciary relationship between the buyer and seller of
a security is found, an affirmative duty arises to either disclose
material, nonpublic information or refrain from trading.39 Those
who do not have a fiduciary relationship do not have a duty to
disclose any information, and will not violate Rule 10b-5 by
trading on inside information.4" In Chiarella, the defendant had no
duty to the corporations in whose stocks he traded because he had
no prior relationship with those corporations or their
shareholders.4" The defendant used factors disclosed on nameless
takeover bids to ascertain the identity of corporations whose stock
he expected to be taken over.42 Since the fiduciary element of the
Rule 10b-5 charge was not proven, Chiarella was not required to
abstain from trading or disclose the information upon which he was
trading.43
Supreme Court reversed. Id. The Supreme Court stated that fraud is a necessary element upon which
to base a conviction and that in order to find fraud, an affirmative relationship to speak is a
prerequisite. Id. at 231. The Court found that Chiarella had no relationship to the companies whose
stocks he traded because he had no prior dealings with them, and mere possession of nonpublic
market information does create a fiduciary relationship. Id. at 232.
36. Id. at 230.
37. Id. at 227 (citing Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. 907, 912 n.15 (1961)).
38. Id.
39. Id. at 230-31.
40. Id. at 227-28.
41. Id. at 231.
42. Id.
43. Id.
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After Chiarella, the Supreme Court decided Dirks v. Securities
and Exchange Commission,44 which extended section 10(b)
liability to tippees45 of the insider.' A tipper-tippee situation
arises where the tipper knowingly conveys confidential, material
information to the tippee, with the intention of gleaning some sort
of personal or pecuniary benefit from the act of tipping.47 The
tippee's liability is derivative of the insider tipper's liability,
therefore if the tipper has no duty to the shareholders of the
insider's corporation the tippee has no duty as well.4' That is,
after Dirks, a tippee will only be held liable if the insider, the
tipper, breached his or her fiduciary duty and the tippee knew of
the tipper's breach of duty.49 The Dirks court reasoned that a
tippee should no more be able to use inside information than an
insider, when the tippee knew or should have known that the
information came from an insider.5" The tipper should not be able
to accomplish indirectly, by giving inside information to tippees to
trade on and gaining some kind of benefit, that which the tipper
could not legally accomplish directly by trading on the inside
information.5
The tippee normally has no direct relationship to the company
whose stocks are traded, whereas usually the insider does, so the
tippee must inherit his or her duty from the insider.52 The tippee
44. 463 U.S. 646 (1983).
45. Tippee liability occurs where an insider gives inside information to another, intending to
benefit personally, thereby breaching a fiduciary relationship. LANOEVOORT, supra note 16, §4.01 at
99. The tippee must know of or have reason to know of the breach. Id.
46. Dirks v. Securities and Exchange Comm'n, 463 U.S. 646, 649-50. Dirks was an officer
of a broker-dealer firm and specialized in analyzing insurance company securities for institutional
investors. Id. Dirks was involved in an investigation of the financial stability of a corporation. Id.
Although neither Dirks nor the company for which he worked traded these stocks, Dirks discussed
the problem freely with other investors with whom he was acquainted. Id. The individuals to whom
Dirks passed this information could be held liable as tippees of Dirks, if Dirks had breached a
fiduciary relationship to the corporation whose stocks were traded. Id. at 654-664. Dirks had no
preexisting relationship to the company at the time he revealed the information to the investors and,
as there was no primary breach, no derivative breaches of tippees could follow. Id. at 665-667.
47. Id. at 659.
48. Id. at 654-64.
49. Id. at 660.
50. Id. at 659.
51. Id.
52. Id. at 660-61.
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assumes the fiduciary relationship of the tipper by reason of the
improper disclosure of the information in breach of the insider's
independent relationship with the shareholder. 3 Thus, if a tipper
breaches his or her fiduciary relationship by disclosing inside
information to a tippee, the tippee must either abstain from trading
on the information or disclose the information before trading upon
it."' It appears that because the SEC developed Rule 14e-3 shortly
after the Chiarella decision, the SEC was attempting to circumvent
the fiduciary requirement developed in Chiarella."
2. The Misappropriation Theory
Under the misappropriation theory, a Rule 10b-5 violation
occurs where an individual, not owing a fiduciary duty to
shareholders, trades any security through the secret conversion of
information entrusted to the trader for his or her personal use.
5 6
Under the misappropriation theory, liability is based on the
defendant's misappropriation and personal use of corporate
information, thus, the basis of liability is misuse, not a fiduciary's
fraudulent failure to disclose, as in the abstain or disclose
theory.5 7 It must be shown that the defendant knew that the
information was of a confidential nature before liability can be
imposed, otherwise the defendant does not breach a duty to his or
her source of information. 8 This theory was intended to cover the
situations not encompassed by the abstain or disclose theory, such
as in Chiarella, where the Court found that the defendant misused
information, but did not have a fiduciary relationship with the
shareholders whose shares he purchased.59 The misappropriation
theory was also meant to cover the cases in which the insider did
not breach any fiduciary relationship by tipping another, but
53. Id. at 661.
54. Id. at 665.
55. LANGEVOORT, supra note 16, §7.01 at 181. See supra notes 35-43 (discussing the
fiduciary requirement of Chiarella).
56. See Langevoort, supra note 16 (analyzing the misappropriation theory).
57. Id.
58. United States v. Reed, 601 F. Supp. 685, 703 (S.D.N.Y. 1985).
59. Langevoort, supra note 16, §6.02 at 148.
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misused the information to the detriment of unknowing
shareholders.6' In United States v. Carpenter6' the defendants
were found guilty of misappropriating material nonpublic
information from their employer, the Wall Street Journal.62
However, the Supreme Court was evenly split regarding the
convictions of the defendants and so, it cannot be stated that the
misappropriation theory is accepted by the Supreme Court at this
time.63 The employees would use information to be contained in
future stories and the time at which they were to be printed, to
facilitate their own trading in the securities of the companies which
were the subject of the stories." This information was understood
by the employees to be of a confidential nature.65 The defendants
argued that since they owed no duty of confidentiality to the
corporations or the stockholders whose stocks they traded, they
could not be found guilty of violating Rule 10b-5.6' The court
stated that this was too narrow a reading of the rule, and that the
misappropriation theory is broader, applying to fraudulent
appropriation of other persons property right entrusted by that
person to another.67 The court stated that the defendants'
convictions were predicated upon the improper conversion of
information."8 The court found that the defendants had stolen
60. Id.
61. 484 U.S. 19 (1987).
62. Id.
63. Id. at 24.
64. Id at 23. One of the defendants was one of the authors of a Wall Street Journal column
in the newspaper called the "Heard on the Street." Id. These columns were influential and read by
most readers. Id. The defendants would use securities related information, which had not been
released to the public, to buy and sell securities. Id.
65. Id. All new employees were given an information manual when they began to work for
the Wall Street Journal, which stated that all news information was confidential. Id.
66. Id. at 27.
67. Id. at 27. There is no requirement that the trader be an insider or that he commit the fraud
upon the buyer or seller of the security. Id. The only requirement is that the trading is based on
improperly gained information, regardless of the source of the information. Id. United States v.
Newsman, 664 F.2d 12 (2d Cir. 1981).
68. Id. at 28. It is not the mere use of information which is not available to other traders
which is the basis of the misappropriation theory, it is the type of conduct which was used to develop
the information for use in connection with the trading of securities. Id. -[O]ne may not gain such
advantage by conduct constituting secreting, stealing, purloining or otherwise misappropriating
material nonpublic information in breach of an employer-imposed fiduciary relationship of
1463
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information which their employer had informed them was
confidential, and had thus misappropriated the information."
Further, the court stated that because this fraud and deceit was
exercised upon their employer and was in connection with a
securities transaction, the defendants' acts were a violation of Rule
10b-5 under the misappropriation theory.7"
3. Rule 14e-3
Rule 14e-3 states that one who is in possession of material
nonpublic information in connection with a tender offer and who
trades in the stocks of the target company, violates the rule.7 As
written, there is no explicit fiduciary duty requirement under this
rule. Consequently, Rule 14e-3 prohibits trades with an offeree
corporation's shareholders even though there is no fiduciary
relationship with such shareholder. In Securities and Exchange
Commission v. Musella7 2 the court found the defendant guilty of
violating Rule 14e-3 even though there was no fiduciary
relationship.73 The court first found a Rule 10b-5 violation, and
then went on to state that since Rule 14e-3 had the same elements
as Rule 10b-5, less the fiduciary element, the defendants were also
guilty of the Rule 14e-3 charge.74
confidentiality.' United States v. Carpenter, 791 F.2d 1024, 1031 (2d Cir. 1986), aff'd, 484 U.S. 19
(1987).
69. Carpenter, 484 U.S. at 27-28.
70. Id.
71. See 17 C.F.R. 240.14e-3 (1990). See also LANGmvoORTsupra note 16, §7.01-7.05 at 181-
98. Rule 14e-3 states as follows: a person possessing material information relating to a tender offer
is prohibited from trading the target company securities if (1) the tender offeror has begun to take
or taken a substantial step toward commencement of the bid; (2) the possessor of the information
knows or has reason to know that the information was acquired from the tender offeror or the target
company; and (3) the possessor of the information knows or has reason to know that the information
is nonpublic. Id. §7.01 at 181.
72. 578 F. Supp. 425 (S.D.N.Y. 1984).
73. Id. at 443.
74. Id. The defendants in this case were given material nonpublic information from an insider
who was familiar with tender offers which were to take place. Id. The defendants traded on the
information, thereby violating their inherited fiduciary relationship under tippee liability. Id. Based
on the foregoing facts, the court found that the defendants violated Rule 10b-5. Id.
1464
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The abstain and disclose theory makes an insider liable for
trading on inside information and requires the defendant to breach
a fiduciary duty to the shareholder as a prerequisite for liability.75
On the other hand, Rule 14e-3 is intended to stop the same activity
in the tender offer context, but as interpreted by the courts prior to
Chestman, does not require such a fiduciary relationship for there
to be a violation of the Rule.76 The next section will analyze the
Chestman opinion. Part III will then determine the significance of
the Chestman decision and explore the legal ramifications this
decision could have in the future.
77
II. THE CASE
In the plurality opinion in United States v. Chestman, a panel
of the Second Circuit Court of Appeals sought to clarify the
requirements for a Rule 14e-3 violation. The three judges each took
a different view as to whether Rule 14e-3 was valid, since the
Security and Exchange Commission's promulgation of Rule 14e-3
lacked a fiduciary relationship among its elements. Chestman
held that the SEC could not enlarge the scope of section 14(e) by
changing the meaning of fraud in the context of a tender offer by
failing to include a fiduciary relationship element.79 The panel
held that the person obtaining the inside information owed and
breached a fiduciary relationship to the person from whom the
information was obtained in order to find a violation of
Rule 14e-3.8°
75. See supra fiotes 32-70 and accompanying text (discussing Rule lOb-5).
76. See supra notes 71-75 and accompanying text (discussing Rule 14e-3).
77. See infra notes 149-152 and accompanying text (discussing the legal ramifications and
conclusions drawn from the Chestman decision).
78. Chestman, 903 F.2d at 86.
79. Chestnan, 903 F.2d at 84. See infra notes 78-149 and accompanying text (analyzing the
Second Circuit Court of Appeals decision).
80. Chestman, 903 F.2d at 84. See infra notes 78-149 and accompanying text (analyzing the
Second Circuit Court of Appeals decision).
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A. The Facts
Robert Chestman worked as a stockbroker and financial advisor
for the brokerage house of Gruntal & Co.81 Keith Loeb met with
Chestman in 1982 to discuss setting up some brokerage accounts
at Gruntal & Co. and to consolidate Loeb's various accounts.
8 2
The intent of this discussion was to consolidate Loeb's holdings in
Waldbaum, Inc. 3 Waldbaum is a public company and its shares
are traded in the over-the-counter market." During their
discussions Loeb told Chestman that Loeb's wife was the niece of
Ira Waldbaum, the president and holder of a controlling block of
stock in Waldbaum.8' Chestman performed several transactions
for Loeb involving Waldbaum's restricted and common stock.1
6
In November, 1986, Ira Waldbaum negotiated with the Great
Atlantic and Pacific Tea Company, Inc. for the sale of Waldbaum
to Great Atlantic." On November 21, 1986 Great Atlantic and
Waldbaum executed a stock purchase agreement which mandated
that Ira Waldbaum tender a controlling block of Waldbaum stock
to Great Atlantic, and that Great Atlantic pay fifty dollars per share
to Ira Waldbaum.88 Ira Waldbaum told his sister (Loeb's mother-
in-law) that Waldbaum would tender her shares of Waldbaum stock
as part of the tender offer, but that she should tell no one of this
transaction, fearing such disclosure could ruin the sale. 9 Loeb's
wife tried to call her mother on November 24, but was unable to
reach her because her mother was turning over her shares to Ira
Waldbaum at that time." Later that same day Loeb's wife spoke
with her mother and was told of the sale agreement between
81. Chestman, 903 F.2d at 77.
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Id.
1466
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Waldbaum and Great Atlantic.91 Loeb's wife was cautioned not
to tell anyone, except her husband, because it might ruin the
sale.' Later, Loeb's wife imparted this knowledge to Loeb, again
with the caution that the information was to remain confidential or
the sale could be ruined.93 Between 9:00 a.m. and 10:30 a.m. on
the morning of November 26, Loeb told Chestman that he had
accurate information indicating Waldbaum stock was to be sold at
a price substantially higher than the market price.9' At that time
Chestman refused to give Loeb any advice on what action, if any,
to take.95 That same day, Chestman purchased 3,000 shares of
Waldbaum stock at $24.65 per share for himself and another 8,000
shares at prices ranging from $25.75 and $26.00 per share.9 Of
the 8,000 shares purchased, 1,000 were for Loeb, and the other
7,000 shares were for Chestman's various discretionary
accounts.97 As a result of a subsequent SEC investigation, the
SEC entered into an agreement by which Loeb was forced to
disgorge his profits from the 1,000 share purchase and pay a
f'me.98
Chestman appeared before the SEC, claiming that he had not
spoken to Loeb before Chestman made the 1,000 share purchase,
and that this purchase, and the ones which followed, were made
upon Chestman's independent research.99 The SEC began
investigating Chestman's trades."° The SEC filed suit against
Chestman and obtained convictions for ten counts of securities
fraud under Rule 10b-5, ten counts of mail fraud, ten counts of
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. Id. at 77-78.
98. Id. at 78.
99. Id.
100. Id.
1467
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fraud regarding the tender offer under section 14(e) and Rule
14e-3, and one count of perjury in connection with Chestman's
testimony before the SEC.'01
B. The Second Circuit's Opinion
The panel decision of the Second Circuit Court of Appeals
reversed the district court, overruling Chestman's convictions on all
counts. 1
0 2
1. The Rule 10b-5 Convictions
A determinative element of a Rule 10b-5 violation requires the
defendant to have obtained the information traded on through a
breach of a fiduciary relationship.0 3 In this case, the Second
Circuit found no evidence indicating that Chestman had breached
any fiduciary relationship by revealing the information of the
tender offer between Great Atlantic and Waldbaum, since he was
not in possession of confidential information.""° The SEC was
unable to show that Chestman had any knowledge, constructive or
otherwise, of Loeb's duty to keep silent about the tender offer.0 5
The court stated that it could not impute knowledge of
101. Id.
102. Id. at 84.
103. Id. at 79. See supra notes 36-40 and accompanying text (discussing the fiduciary
relationship element of Rule lob-5).
104. Chestman, 903 F.2d at 79. The attenuated passage of the information through the
Waldbaum family members had stripped the information of its confidentiality, with no evidence
presented by the SEC to the contrary. Id.
105. Id. The United States failed to show Chestman knew of the pledges of secrecy between
Ira Waldbaum and his sister, and between Waldbaum's daughter and her husband. Id. The court
hypothesized that even if it were assumed that Chestman had knowledge of the confidentiality of the
information, there was not any evidence that Loeb had accepted this relationship and therefore the
required chain of confidentiality could not be demonstrated. Id. Compare United States v. Reed, 601
F.Supp. 685 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) (demonstrating when a family relationship becomes enough to create
a confidentiality chain of trust) with United States v. Chestman, 903 F.2d 75 (2nd Cir. 1990) (a
family relationship was not sufficient to create a chain or trust and confidentiality). The son
misappropriated from his father nonpublic, confidential information about a merger of two companies.
Reed, 601 F. Supp. at 699. Factors to be considered in determining the existence of a confidential
relationship are: (I) The difference in the positions of the parties; (2) the trust which one party has
in the other, (3) reliance; and (4) level of dominance. Id. at 703-08.
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confidentiality to Chestman because the information was passed in
such an indirect fashion.'06 The Supreme Court in Dirks, applying
the fiduciary relationship requirement to the tipper-tippee situation,
stated that in a Section 10(b) and a Rule 10b-5 case, the tippee, in
this case Chestman, must have knowledge of the breach by the
tipper, in this case Loeb, to be held liable."0 7 Because there was
no such showing made in this case, the panel reversed the Rule
10b-5 securities fraud charges under the abstain or disclose
theory.' This is so because Chestman owed no fiduciary duty
to the corporation whose shares he traded, since he did not know
of the breach by Loeb.'09 Thus, Chestman neither had to disclose
the information of the tender offer nor abstain from trading on the
information, and thus he did not violate Rule 10b-5."
2. The Section 14(e) and Rule 14e-3 Convictions
Each of the three panel judges presented different views
regarding the Section 14(e) and Rule 14e-3 convictions."1' Judge
Miner would have affnned the Section 14(e) and Rule 14e-3
convictions."' Judges Mahoney and Carman both agreed that the
14-3 violations should be reversed, however, each judge cited
different reasons."
3
As a defense to the Section 14(e) and Rule 14e-3 convictions,
Chestman asserted that, in promulgating Rule 14e-3, the SEC went
beyond its rule-making authority under section 14(e) by imposing
liability without requiring a showing a fiduciary relationship."'
In response to this argument, Judge Miner stated that rules which
106. Chestman, 903 F.2d at 79.
107. Id. (citing Dirks v. Securities and Exchange Commission, 463 U.S. 646, 660 (1983)).
108. Id. at 80. See supra notes 31-55 and accompanying text (discussing the abstain or disclose
theory).
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. Id. at 82-88.
112. Id. at 84.
113. Id. at 86 (Mahoney, L, concurring in part and dissenting in part), id. at 86 (Carman, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part).
114. Id. at 83.
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are not consistent with or which hinder congressional policy may
be rejected. 15 Rule 14e-3, the judge stated, follows Congress'
policy of protecting persons who invest in and take part in tender
offers by preventing manipulative acts.'16 Judge Miner found
consistency between the congressional policy in section 14(e) and
Rule 14e-3, since Rule 14e-3 protects parties involved in tender
offers by disallowing any use or possession of inside information
in a tender offer context." 7 Although Rule 14e-3 is void of an
explicit fiduciary relationship, imposing such a requirement is not
inconsistent with or offensive to the congressional policy.118
Judge Miner reasoned that because the object of Rule 14e-3 is to
deter insiders from converting their knowledge to profits, the fact
that Rule 14e-3 does not require a fiduciary relationship will act as
a more formidable deterrent since a fiduciary relationship will not
have to be proven."' Additionally, Judge Miner noted that Rule
14e-3 is particularly directed at tender offers, not to trading on
inside information in general, and thus does not have to be equal
to Rule 10b-5.120
Chestman continued his challenge to the validity of Rule 14e-3
by asserting that, since Rule 14e-3 was modeled after section 10(b)
and Rule 10b-5, Rule 14e-3 should be consistent with those
provisions, and liability should be found only where a fiduciary or
confidential relationship exists, since section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5
require such a relationship.12' Judge Miner found that while Rule
14e-3 may be modeled after section 10b and Rule 10b-5, there is
no requirement that Rule 14e-3 be modeled after the earlier
provisions, because the SEC is empowered to regulate any activity,
deceptive or nondeceptive12 2 Because Judge Miner found that
115. Id. at 83. (quoting Federal Election Comm'n v. Democratic Senatorial Campaign
Comm'n., 454 U.S. 27, 32 (1981)).
116. Id.
117. Id. Rule 14e-3 disallows the possession and use of inside information in connection with
a tender offer by persons other than the tender offeror or the target company. Id.
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. Id. at 82.
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Rule 14e-3 does not have to follow the mold of the earlier
provisions, he found the creation of Rule 14e-3 did not go beyond
the rule-making authority of the SEC.
123
Judge Mahoney joined in the reversal of the Rule 10b-5 charge,
but took exception to Judge Miner's finding that in creating Rule
14e-3 the SEC acted within the bounds of its congressional
authority to make rules regulating insider trading.124 Judge
Mahoney focused on the second sentence of section 14(e) which
states "[t]he commission shall, for the purposes of this subsection,
by rules and regulations define, and prescribe means reasonably
designed to prevent, such acts and practices as are fraudulent,
deceptive, or manipulative." 1" This sentence granted the SEC
authority to make rules controlling insider trading.12 6 Judge
Mahoney stated that the findings which were made in Chiarella as
to Rule lOb-5 are applicable to section 14(e) in a general sense,
because Rule 14e-3 was modeled upon the general anti-fraud
structure and policy of Rule 10b-5. 27  Thus, because the
Chiarella court interpreted similar language in Rule lOb-5 to
require a fiduciary relationship in order to be valid, a similar
requirement should be extended to Rule 14e-3.128 Judge Mahoney
stated that the SEC has basically rewritten the law by defining the
term "fraudulent" in Rule 14e-3 without requiring a fiduciary
element, since fraud has historically required an element of a
fiduciary relationship.'29
The Supreme Court in Schreiber v. Burlington Northern,
Inc.13 stated that the powers granted to the SEC did not
empower the agency to change the meaning of the word
123. Id.
124. Id. at 84 (Mahoney, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
125. Id. (Mahoney, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (citing 15 U.S.C. § 78n(e)
(1988)).
126. Id. at 85 (Mahoney, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
127. Id. (Mahoney, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). See Connecticut Nat'l Bank
v. Fluor Corp., 808 F.2d 957, 961 (2nd Cir. 1987) (prior case law has found the principles of Rule
lOb-5 applicable to section 14(e) violations).
128. Chestman, 903 F.2d at 85-86 (Mahoney J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
129. Id. (Mahoney, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
130. 472 U.S. 1 (1985).
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"manipulative," which is included in Rule lOb-5.13' Since the
Schreiber Court held that the SEC had no power to change the
word "manipulative" itself, Judge Mahoney believed that the SEC
should not be able to change the other substantive words in the rule
either, including "fraudulent" or "deceptive." 13 2 The Supreme
Court of the United States has explicitly stated that the authority
given to administrative agencies, such as the SEC, is not the power
to make law through the adoption of rules that exceed the scope of
the underlying statute. 33
Judge Mahoney further stated that the casual references in the
House Reports on Rule 14e-3 did not indicate an acceptance of the
failure to include a fiduciary relationship, but in fact the reports
explicitly state that the underlying case law interpretations of the
insider trading rules were to remain unchanged.134 Therefore,
Rule 14e-3 was an invalid exercise of the rulemaking authority of
the SEC since the rule made a substantive change in the law by
failing to include a fiduciary relationship as a necessary element of
the term "fraudulent. 13 1
Judge Carman concurred with Judge Miner's decision as to the
Rule lOb-5 violations, however Judge Carman joined Judge
Mahoney in dissent as to the Rule 14e-3 violation.1 36 Judge
Carman agreed with Judge Mahoney in finding that if the SEC
failed to include a fiduciary element in Rule 14e-3 it would
constitute a violation of its rule-making authority because the SEC
would then have redefined fraud, which its authority does not
encompass.1 37 Judge Carman, however, unlike Judge Mahoney,
131. Id. at 10, n.10. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1990).
132. Chestman, 903 F.2d at 86, (Mahoney, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
133. Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 213 (1976).
134. Chestman, 903 F.2d at 86, (Mahoney, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (citing
H. RL REP. No. 100-910, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 7, reprinted in 1988 U.S. CODE CoNo. & ADMIN.
NEWS 6043, 6051).
135. Id. (Mahoney, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
136. Id. (Carman, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
137. Id. (Carman, L, concurring in part and dissenting in part). "Congress directed only that
the SEC prescribed means reasonably designed to prevent fraudulent, deceptive or manipulative acts
and prectices by rules and regulations." Id. See 15 U.S.C. § 78n(e) (1938) (provides the authorization
for the SEC to promulgate rules and regulations to regulate acts and practices which are fraudulent,
deceptive, or manipulative). The reach of a rule should not be allowed to go beyond the powers
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decided not to read the rule to textually require a fiduciary
relationship, since such a textual element is just not there.'38
Further, Judge Carman did not find the rule to be inconsistent with
the SEC's power, since administrative agencies, such as the SEC,
are entitled to a presumption of regularity in the way they carry out
their duties, and it is presumed that administrative agencies will act
properly and according to law when exercising their statutorily
granted powers.'39 To support this finding, Judge Carman went
on to state that, since the promulgation of Rule 14e-3 came soon
after Chiarella, the SEC knew the rule would be interpreted to
include the common elements constituting fraud, including a
fiduciary relationship."4° Because a fiduciary relationship is a
basic part of Rule 10b-5, promulgated to control insider trading,
and because Rule 10b-5 is based on the same substantive elements
of law as Rule 14e-3, Judge Carman reasoned that in promulgating
Rule 14e-3 the SEC intended a fiduciary relationship to be
required, just as one is required in Rule lOb-5.' Under Judge
Carman's interpretation, the SEC has not exceeded its
congressional authority to enact rules and regulations.142 Since it
must be presumed that the SEC meant to include the fiduciary
element in Rule 14e-3, the SEC would not have rewritten the
statutorily granted to the SEC. Cf. Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185,214 (1976). Redefining
the meaning of "fraud" would exceed the authority granted in section 14(e). Chestman, 903 F.2d
at 87 (Carman, J. concurring in part and dissenting in part).
138. Chestman, 903 F.2d at 87 (Carman, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
139. Id. (Carman, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (citing FCC v. Schreiber, 381
U.S. 279, 296 (1965).
140. Id. (Carman, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). The act of fraud requires
scienter, a state of mind which having the intent to deceive, manipulate, or defraud and a breach of
a relationship. Id. See Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 663 n.23 (1983) (defiming scienter). The Court
determined in Chiarella that a disclosure relationship is created where one party has information the
other party has a right to know of because of a fiduciary relationship or other type of relationship of
trust and confidence between the parties. Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 230 (1979). Judge
Carman seems to be saying that, since the Supreme Court decided in ChiareUa that a fiduciary
relationship must be an element of Rule 10b-5, which is based on fraudulent, manipulative and
deceptive acts, rules developed on those same principles must include a fiduciary element and thus
Rule 14e-3 should be interpreted as requiring a fiduciary relationship even though the text of the rule
does not. Chestman, 903 F.2d at 87 (Carman, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
141. Id.
142. Id. (Carman, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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requirements of fraud, thus hindering Congress' policies toward the
regulation of the insider trading activity. 43
III. LEGAL RAMIFICATIONS
Since Chestman was a plurality decision, no one judge's
opinion can be held to be the definitive word on the status of Rule
14e-3. However, two of the judges, Judge Mahoney and Judge
Carman, agreed that in order to be a valid rule, 14e-3 needs to
have a fiduciary relationship included among its elements. 1"
Thus, after the Chestman decision, the elements of a 14e-3
violation, at least in the Second Circuit are: (1) That the person
trading in the security be someone other than the tender
offeror; 4 - (2) that a tender offer has begun or a substantial step
toward that end has been taken;146 (3) that the possessor of the
information knows or has reason to know that the information
came from the tender offeror or the target company; 147 (4) that
the possessor of the information knows or has reason to know that
the information is nonpublic; 1 48 and, as stated in Chestman (5)
that the possessor of the information owes the person with whom
they are trading a fiduciary or similar duty of trust and confidence,
and has breached that duty. 49
The holding in United States v. Chestman makes Rule 14e-3
consistent with other insider trading rules. This redefinition of the
SEC's rule to include a fiduciary relationship will make it harder
to convict an insider under Rule 14e-3, because the government
must prove a fiduciary element which it otherwise would not have
had to prove. Thus, fewer convictions under Rule 14e-3 will
probably result. Although more difficult to prosecute, the inclusion
143. See supra notes 16-25 and accompanying text (discussion of the policies for insider
trading laws).
144. Chesrnan, 903 F.2d at 84 (Mahoney, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part), id. at
87 (Carman, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
145. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14e-3 (1990).
146. Id.
147. Id.
148. Id.
149. Chestman, 903 F.2d at 75 (2nd Cir. 1990).
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of a fiduciary element is proper since the element is consistent with
the congressional policy of regulating insider trading. Without the
fiduciary relationship element, mere possession of the information
would be enough to find a violation of Rule 14e-3. The policy of
Congress is to stop persons who occupy positions which allow
them special access to information or those who wrongfully possess
and use the information to trade. The policy of the insider trading
laws is not meant to deter those persons who come to possess
information by accident. The failure to include a fiduciary
relationship in the Rule may prevent indecision for those traders
who have information but are not fiduciaries. This indecision is not
beneficial to the market because it will make investors leery of
trades which could be beneficial to the U.S. economy. Thus, the
inclusion of the fiduciary element is in keeping with the policy of
guarding the stock market against only those who would trade in
violation of a clearly defined fiduciary duty.
IV. CONCLUSION
One of the reasons Congress created the SEC was to regulate
insider trading within the construction of the law as Congress
determines it."50 The Second Circuit's decision, that a fiduciary
relationship must be found in order to impose liability under Rule
14e-3, is consistent with the prior decisions interpreting the insider
trading laws."" Additionally, the Chestman decision is supported
by the underlying rationale of the insider trading regulations, which
seems to boil down to the simple desire for ultimate fairness in the
system.152
George Jensen Kunzelman
150. See supra notes 26-29 and accompanying text (discussing administrative rule-making
authority).
151. See supra notes 16-25 and accompanying text (discussing the aims of the insider trading
laws).
152. See supra notes 24-25 and accompanying text (discussing the underlying policy of the
insider trading laws).
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